The Camden Expedition of 1864 and the Opportunity Lost by the Confederacy to Change the Civil War by Michael J. Forsyth

Author:Michael J. Forsyth [Forsyth, Michael J.]
Language: eng
Format: epub
Publisher: McFarland
Published: 2007-11-14T00:00:00+00:00

Smith concluded by ordering Taylor to prepare three divisions of his command for service in Arkansas while Taylor would take the remaining division and cavalry to ensure Banks continued his retreat.

The decision infuriated Taylor causing him to launch a series of acidic dispatches at Smith criticizing its substance. Taylor’s barbs failed to move Smith who continued resolutely on with preparations for a counteroffensive in Arkansas. Price’s quiet strategy of providing full support of Smith’s Fabian policy, in spite of his own objections to it, had worked in his favor. Price would soon receive three divisions of infantry, enough to turn the tables on Steele and eventually initiate his long sought invasion to liberate Missouri.

While Smith’s strategy was sound in light of overall Confederate national policy, it would never achieve the sweeping results envisioned by Richard Taylor. Taylor stated at the time and in his memoirs that had he retained the force he had on-hand after Pleasant Hill, he could have destroyed Banks’ army and Porter’s fleet. This would have had a great effect on the entire Confederate war effort by “relieve[ing] the pressure on our suffering brethren in Virginia and Georgia.” He also recognized the plausibility that a disaster in Louisiana combined with continued stalemate in the east would have a negative impact on public opinion in the North. With the presidential election in the offing, this could lead to the defeat of Lincoln at the polls, thereby repudiating his war policies and delivering victory to the Confederacy.45 What Taylor was advocating was a bold move that could deliver a victory decisive in the outcome of the war. Smith, by contrast, supported stated Confederate policy to defend the territory of the Trans-Mississippi, which could never achieve anything beyond the borders of the department.

Smith would not change his mind and by April 14 had the wheels in motion to turn on Steele.46 The unsuspecting Federal commander in Arkansas was still under the impression that Banks was moving according to plan. Steele therefore, continued to do his utmost to fulfill his part of the Red River Campaign even as Banks accused Steele of failing to support him in Louisiana. In an April 17 letter to Lieutenant Commander Thomas O. Selfridge of Porter’s fleet, Banks had the gall to write, “General Steele fails to cooperate with us, as far as we can learn, and thus far renders no assistance.”47 This accusation is unwarranted and made with a dearth of knowledge about the situation in Arkansas. Steele had advanced deep into enemy territory against his better judgement, all the while feeding his men half-rations in country stripped of provender. Steele had certainly done this in full support of Banks and made every reasonable attempt to establish communication with him through the use of couriers.

Underlying Banks’ assertions is an effort to shift full responsibility for the disaster at Mansfield from his shoulders to Steele. Banks simply had no way of knowing the extent of Steele’s effort and therefore discounted it as insufficient. He also tacitly

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